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AUTHOR Dixon, Heriberto
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ABSTRACT

The term "Hispanics" as currently used in the United States is a gross oversimplification of the reality of a highly heterogeneous people. Among the many important variables that divide and subdivide the Hispanic population into distinctive and significant subpopulations are race, language, time of arrival in the United States, national origin, and minority status. The socio-economic profiles of Cuban Americans tend to approximate that of Americans more than that of fellow Hispanics. The most recent wave of Cuban immigrants came from Port Mariel, introducing a large non-white (black or mulatto) population. This particular subpopulation of Cuban immigrants which composes only approximately 10 percent of Cubans in the United States is analyzed in detail. The population's unusual characteristics put it in a sensitive position. Will it identify with black Americans or Cuban Americans? If it is rejected by both goups, will it develop its own marginal and polarized sub-community? Traditional patterns of Cuban immigration and settlement are discussed and tentative racial identification data on Cuban-Americans are presented. A list of 104 endnotes concludes the paper. (ETS)

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The Cuban-American Counterpoint:
Black Cubans in the United States

by: Heriberto Dixon, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Human Resources
Graduate School of Management
New School for Social Research
65 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10003
(212) 741-7757

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I. Introduction

The 1980's has been referred to as the "Decade of the Hispanics" in the United States. In support of this contention it has been reported that the Hispanic population is growing nearly five times faster than that of the general population. Between 1980 and 1985, the Hispanic population grew by approximately 16% against an increase of 3.3% for the general population. This higher growth rate on the part of the Hispanic population is attributed to a combination of high fertility, natural increases and high levels of immigration from Mexico, Cuba, Central and South America. Overall, Hispanics tend to be younger, have larger families, less education, and higher incidences of poverty than the general population. Cubans, however, tend to resemble the profile for the general population more than the profile for Hispanics. In 1980, Hispanics made up 6.4% of the total U.S. population. By March, 1985, they accounted for 7.2% of the total United States population.[1]

In spite of its popularity the term "Hispanic" tends to be rather vague and, in some quarters, highly controversial. For bureaucratic and journalistic convenience, Hispanics are often lumped into an assumed homogeneous category to facilitate being treated, alternatively depending on the specific purpose, as a racial minority or an ethnic group. This tendency to lump all Hispanics into a single category overlooks certain important differences among the specific peoples that comprise the Hispanic group.[2] It is an open question of how many Hispanics are likely to endorse voluntarily the labels of "Hispanic" or "Latino" as a collective term of self-designation. There is a suggestion that certain Hispanics may be suspicious of the term "Hispanics" believing that such a bureaucratic label can be used for political manipulation.[3] For many Hispanic peoples, the key self-identifier is likely to reflect more national origin, e.g., Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Colombia, Dominician Republic, than a generic term encompassing all Hispanic groups. It

remains to be seen whether any such Pan-Hispanic identity will develop in the United States over time or will the individual Hispanics acculturate and be assimilated into the United States mainstream at differential rates.

Taken with the above and other reservations, the term "Hispanics" may be thought of as "a generic form to refer to several groups (Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Mexicans, Hispanos, South Americans, and others) who share some characteristics in different degrees (culture, language, status in society) and are distinguished by significant inter- and intra-group diversity."[4] In other words, the term "Hispanics" as currently used in the United States is a gross oversimplification of the reality of a highly heterogeneous people. Sullivan contends that this heterogenity of the Hispanic population reduces the term "Hispanic" to a merely "heuristic devise."[5] Among the many important variables that divide and subdivide the Hispanic population into distinctive and significant subpopulations, Sullivan identifies race, language, time of arrival in the United States, national origin, and minority status as crucial.[6]

1) Race - Although the original Spanish "conquistadores" and colonists were primarily white, there were a small number of Spanish or Hispanized blacks who also came. Some of these Spanish blacks, e.g., Estebanico et al, gained some measure of fame, recognition and fortune during the colonial era.[7] Almost upon disembarking in the Americas, the first "mestizos", i.e., persons of mixed racial backgrounds, began to appear. Inca Garcilaso de la Vega (1539-1616), the Peruvian writer and historian born in Cuzco, the son of a Spanish captain and a daughter of the Incas typifies the speed of this process of "mestizaje".[8] Later, thanks, in no small part, to the efforts of Fray Bartolome de Las Casas (1471-1566)[9] to save the Indians from slavery and servitude, contributed to the importation of Africans slaves to work the mines and fields. With the arrival of the African slaves, Spanish

America began to mix its three major racial components, i.e., white, red, and black, into the various subracial types known as "castas". The resulting racial typologies produced a variety of colorful terms in an attempt to classify every possible mixture, e.g., mestizo, castizo, mulato, morisco, albino, torna atrás, lobo, zambaigo, cambrujo, albarazado, barcino, coyote, chamiso, ahí te estás, etc.[10] The Latin American racial classification schemes clearly defy the neat black-white dichotomous racial scheme in the United States wherein any person having an known degree of African ancestry (to the 64th degree) is considered as black. Obviously, Hispanics are very heterogeneous with respect to racial origins. Yielding to the pressures in the United States that every one be neatly classified by race, some Hispanics consider themselves to constitute a separate "brown" race,[11] or "La Raza," i.e., non-white and non-black.

If Spanish surnames are used to identify Hispanics, racially the resulting individuals represent American Indians, blacks and a variety of complex admixtures of American Indians, blacks, whites, and more recently, even, Asian backgrounds. The Filipinos whose presence in the United States is increasing, many of whom are Spanish surnamed, e.g., Marcos, Aquino, Garcia, Ver, etc., owing to their Spanish heritage. On the racial variable alone, Hispanics constitute a very racially heterogeneous group where all major racial groups have been fused into what Vasconcelos has called "La Raza Cósmica"[12] (the Cosmic Race).

Spanish surnames are inadequate to accurately identify Hispanics because of the immigration into Latin America from many parts of the world, e.g., Europe, Asia, Africa, North America.[13] As a result of this world-wide immigration, many Latin Americans do not carry Spanish surnames. A number of Latin American rulers reflect their non-Spanish backgrounds by their surnames, e.g., Alessandri, Banzer, Frei, Galtieri, Leoni, Michelsen, Orlich, Schick, Stroessner, Terry, etc.

neither race or Spanish surname taken singly or together are sufficient to identify Hispanics in the United States.

2) Spanish Language - is another important variable when discussing Hispanics in the United States. While many Hispanics report the use of Spanish as their primary language, many do not even speak it at all. Since Hispanics do not constitute a single racial group nor have a common national origin, in some respects, the Spanish language may serve as a Hispanic identifier and a common bond that links Spanish speakers from Spain, Latin America, some parts of Africa, and the Philippines. The English-speaking community, however, is not able or not willing to distinguish the Spanish-speakers from the non-Spanish speakers in the Western Hemisphere. In addition to Spanish, English, French, Portuguese, and Dutch are spoken south of the Río Grande. Yet there is a pervasive tendency to lump Arubans, Brazilians, Haitians, Jamaicans, etc. along side with Hispanics. The language as the means of transmission differential cultural values is important to distinguish.[14]

3) Time of arrival in what is now the United States - has obvious implications. Some Hispanics proudly trace their origins to the early Spanish colonists who settled the Southwestern United States before the country stretched 'from sea to shining sea.' In time, following the dictates of the "Manifest Destiny" these people were overran by Americans and their territories annexed to the United States. In more recent years, the massive arrival Hispanics, legal and undocumented, especially across the United States-Mexican border has stirred great controversies surrounding the issues of controlling United States border via new immigration legislation, better policing of the borders, ferretting out 'illegals', etc. The growth of the Hispanic population in the United States is probably fueling a backlash against Hispanics who may be seen in some quarters as

"taking over" whatever that means. In several instances, for example the heavily Hispanic Dade (Miami), Florida, the non-Hispanic communities have lobbied and voted against bilingual programs, the public use of the Spanish language, and other measures perceived as preferential treatment for Hispanics over non-Hispanics. The latest (1980) wave of Cuban immigrants (Mariel) received a colder and less enthusiastic reception than did the prior waves since 1959.

4) National origin - is another important consideration. Hispanics have come to the United States from a large number of Spanish-speaking countries, from Spain to Latin America (including some parts of Africa and the Philippines) and the United States possession of the Island of Puerto Rico. Each country has its unique history, culture, literature, traditions, psychology, art and accent. Harrison, for example, outlines the dramatic differences between Nicaragua and its Central American next door neighbor, Costa Rica.[15] Although, unknowledgeable people for convenience would like to lump all Latin American countries together, their individual realities defy such a simple-minded notion. Along these lines, the United States Census Bureau identifies the major national groups of Hispanics as Mexicans, Cubans, Central and South Americans, and other Hispanics.[16] The 'other Hispanics' include people from Spain, mixed heritage or self-identified as Hispanic-American or 'Latinos'[17] Puerto Ricans, or United States citizens since 1927, must be treated differently.

5) Minority status - there are two major views on approaching minority status. One view is to consider the Hispanic population as another minority group to be compared with blacks, Asian-Americans, and other racial minorities. Another view of Hispanics is that of another ethnic group to be compared to other (predominately white) ethnic groups.

Given the historic subjugation of Spanish-speaking people, especially in the Southwestern United States, Hispanics share with blacks and other racial minority

groups the bitter experience of de jure and de facto discrimination and segregation. Notwithstanding similar experiences of discrimination and segregation, not all Hispanics voluntarily embrace a minority group status. Minority status may be ascribed to certain Hispanic subgroups and not to others.[18]

As an example, Llanes reports that Cubans experience ethnicity as a new concept. By viewing themselves as an ethnic group, the Cubans would be lumped into a category of people who in the United States as known by various, and some times pejorative, names, e.g., Hispanics (sharing a common Spanish heritage), Latinos (more to their liking), Spanish-speaking (descriptive), Spanish-surnamed (limited), Spics (pejorative), etc. The Cuban-American middle class is 92% white and is, therefore, more able than certain other Hispanic groups to align itself racially with the dominant cultural groups in the United States. In recognition of the fact that certain immigrant groups find it easier to "pass" than others, and, in effect, do so. Cuban-Americans, insofar as they are perceived of as white, generally have not suffered from systematic problems of restrictive housing, school segregation, and/or job discrimination. Usually, they express satisfaction of being generally able to do as they please and to live in the style that they desire most for themselves and their children. These Cuban-Americans already share many of the key cultural values of the surrounding host society and constantly acquire new ones. Furthermore, they seem willing to ignore and otherwise tolerate the existing racial prejudices in American society and are less likely than other Hispanics to fight for racial equality. The Cuban-Americans seem to accept the inherent inequality suffered by immigrant groups as natural and self-correcting over time.[19] In fact, certain non-Cuban Hispanic groups express concern that upper status Latin Americans, frequently Cubans, might be assigned the social and economic rules of supervising lower status Hispanic laborers and to serve as their spokesmen.[20]

II. Cubans in the United States

In most discussions about Hispanics, Cuban-Americans are mentioned as exceptions to the rule inasmuch as their socio-economic profiles tend to approximate that of Americans in general than that of fellow Hispanics. Cuban-Americans approach the national averages in terms of median age, percentage of married couples, family size, per capita income.[21]

The bulk of the Cuban immigration to the United States has taken place in the wake of the coming to power of the Cuban Revolution in January, 1959. Prior to that time, only 50,000 persons identified as Cubans were reported living in the United States. These were the remants of smaller nuclei of Cubans who made their way to the United States in earlier times. Cubans, as a general rule, were never particularly given to emigration.

Cuba, in fact, was a host country for immigrants from many parts of the world. In reaction to the Haitian Revolt of 1791, the then Cuban colonial government sought ways to increase immigration as a means of counterbalancing the potential threat posed by the large number of black slaves. Canary Islanders, Mexican Indians and Chinese were among the first groups to immigrate to Cuba. Later, the French from Haiti were granted free entry until 1807. The early gains in attracting non-black immigrants, however, were partially offset, in the 1920's by the need to bring in black Antilleans, e.g., Jamaican, Haitian, Barbardian, etc., as "macheteros" to harvest the sugar cane. One estimate places some 200,000 Antillean blacks in Cuba by 1931.[22]

There was an early wave of Cuban immigrants into the United States towards the latter part of the 19th century. Around that time, there were approximately 100,000 Cubans living in the United States concentrated primarily in New York City, Tampa, Key West and some other Florida cities. From 1868 to 1895, a

sizeable group of Cubans, in part, fleeing the armed conflicts for Cuban independence, founded the cigar industry in South Florida and established the first large community of Cuban-Americans. The American cigar industry was born within a dozen black area of the then small unincorporated area which became known as Ybor City, named for one of its founders, don Vicente Martínez Ybor, in 1885. Two years later, the City of Tampa annexed Ybor City over the objectives of Mr. Martínez Ybor. In October, 1885, the workers of the Sánchez y Hoya rolled the first "Havana" cigar. A year later, the factory was producing 500,000 hand rolled cigars a month. Tampa, also occupies a prominent place in Cuban history, Jose Martí, the father of Cuban independence, went to Tampa on several occasions to raise money among the generously patriotic tampenos for the revolutionary cause. Tampa manages to retain much of its original Cuban flavor.[23]

The Cuban Revolution of 1959 marked the watershed for the next major influx of Cubans into the United States. In order to characterize this most recent immigration, Llanes identifies three major waves based on time of arrival in the United States for the period 1959 to 1980.

The First Wave began immediately after the Castro assumption of power on January 1, 1959 and ended at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Approximately 280,000 Cubans entered the United States during this time period. Demographically, the First Wave tended to be rather homogeneous, i.e., predominately white (94%), middle-aged (average 34 years old), well-educated (average 14 years of schooling). Politically, the identified readily with the conservative wing of the Republican Party. In many ways, they were viewed as economically, politically advantageous for the United States. Being well-educated, sharing a strong work ethic, they were ready, able, and willing to bring some capital assets with them to start a new life. Others had reliable networks of friends, family

and/or business associates which facilitated their transition into United States society.[24]

Between the First and Second Waves, less than 3,000 Cubans entered the United States. The Second Wave began with a dramatic sea-lift operation from the Port of Camarioca in 1965 which later converted to an airlift called the "Freedom Flights" from Varadero ending in December 1973. An additional 273,000 Cubans entered the United States as part of the Second Wave.[25] This wave was more heterogeneous than the First Wave, although whites still constituted the majority (76%) the remaining 24% was made up of blacks, mulattos, and Asians. In addition to the well-educated, there were also substantial numbers of tradesmen, carpenters, plumbers, masons, farmers, fishermen, etc. They brought few capital assets with them but they shared the same cultural values with the First Wave relative to the work ethic and drive for economic self-sufficience. Also, the Second Wave brought more academic and intellectual people. For example, the City of Miami gained over 18,000 lawyers, 2,500 doctors, 1,600 teachers, and 4,600 carpenters, masons, and bricklayers all willing to work for the minimum wage.[26]

Again between the Second and Third Waves, only a small number of Cubans entered the United States. The Third Wave began with the takeover of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana by more than 10,000 Cubans in April 1980 which culminated in the massive sea lift operation from the Port Mariel delivering over 125,000 people to the United States by the time it ended in October 1980.[27]

The 125,000 Cubans that entered the United States augmented the Cuban-American population by approximately 16%. The United States Bureau of Census estimated that in March 1979 there was a total of 794,000 people who considered themselves to be of Cuban origin or descent.[28]

The available data on Mariel Cubans indicate that they are different in the following ways from earlier Cuban immigrants. They are more likely:

1) to have been in unskilled or manual labor jobs in Cuba and less likely to have been in white-collar or professional jobs than the earlier groups.[29] Based on data collected at the four major camps, i.e., Eglin, Chaffee, Indiantown Gap, and McCoy, the Mariel Cubans were concentrated in craft (25.3%), labor (18.8%), machine operative (15.4%), and transport operative (11.0%) jobs. These occupations reflect the Mariel Cubans' origin in the larger cities where factory service, and construction jobs prevail. Very few of the Mariel Cubans were farm laborers (2.0%) or farmers (1.4%). Many of the farm laborers were sugar cane cutters. The number of professional and technical workers was higher than what might have been expected given the negative publicity. Over 9% of the Mariel Cubans confined to the camps reported that type of employment.[30]

2) to be single than earlier immigrants. The Mariel Cubans report 33% single persons versus 15% for the previous groups up to 1971.[31] Also, the Mariel Cubans show a higher divorce rate of 10.7% against only 5% for earlier Cubans.[32]

3) to be predominately male. The percentage of males among the Mariel Cubans were 70.2% versus 42.1% among the Varadero-Miami Freedom Flights.[33]

4) to be within a more narrow age range. A smaller portion of the Mariel Cubans were under 18 years of age (20.1%), which contrasted with the 33.5% for the airlift arrivals. However, the median age of the Mariel Cubans tended to be younger with a full 68.5% below 36 years of age.[34]

5) to be non-white, i.e., black or mulatto. Although blacks and mulattos make up about 27.2% of the population of Cuba in 1953.[35] The earlier Cuban immigrants were predominantly white (95%). The Mariel Cubans were from 60% to 80% white.[36] The wide range probably result from the attempts to classify the mulattos, i.e., racially mixed. Undoubtedly, many of the lighter mulattos will attempt to "pass" for white in the United States.[37] Race like beauty tends to be in the eye of the beholder.

The average level of schooling of the Mariel Cubans based on a survey taken in Miami was 9 years which compares closely to the level of schooling of the Second Wave immigrants. Not surprisingly, only about 2% to 5% of the Mariel Cubans could communicate in English upon arrival.[38]

The fact that a substantial number of the Mariel Cubans were black or mulatto indicates, on the one hand, a closer approximation to the racial composition of the source population and, on the other, a significant new contribution to the Cuban-American community. To what extent has this new racial component influenced the unprecedented negative portrayal of Cuban immigrants is a question that few have dared to ask, let alone answer.[39]

III. Afro-Cubans

Fernando Ortiz once described Cuban society as a counterpoint, i.e., bipolar, where one half is white, refined and sweet like sugar, and the other half is dark, raw and pungent like tobacco. Ortiz continued his analogy by recognizing that the tobacco is dark, ranging from black to mulatto, sugar is light ranging from mulatto to white. Tobacco does not change its color; it is born dark and dies of its race. Sugar, on the other hand, changes its coloring, it is born brown and whitens itself; at first it is a syrupy mulatto and in this state pleases the common taste; then it is bleached and refined until it can pass for white, travel all over the world, reach all mouths, and bring a better price, climbing to the top of the social ladder.[40]

In 1953, the official census estimated the combined black and mulatto population to be 27.2% of the total. The black and mulatto share of the Cuban had decreased from 32.1% back in 1899. Around the turn of the century, especially white immigration to offset the large numbers of blacks and mulattos. By 1907, the black and mulatto share had been reduced to 29.7%. The census of 1919 and 1931 the blacks and mulattos remained at 27.2% probably due, in part, to the

importation of West Indian and Haitian sugar cane cutters. By 1943, the black and mulatto reduced again to 25.6% probably reflecting the forced repatriation of large numbers of West Indians and Haitians who attempted to remain in Cuba. By 1953, as mentioned above, the figure for blacks and mulattos had reached the 1919 and 1931 former levels of 27.2%.[41] Racial statistics since the 1953 census have been extremely difficult to obtain.[42]

While many prominent white Cubans dispute the existence of racial discrimination in pre-1959 Cuba, Thomas states that there was some kind of racial discrimination in Cuba although less pervasive and less virulent than in the United States by comparison.[43] After the abortive race war of 1912, where an estimated 3,000 blacks lost their lives,[44] blacks and mulattos rarely enjoyed the prominence in national affairs that they had enjoyed since 1902. Although at the local level, black and mulatto politicians achieved some measures of success. For example, Justo Salas, a black, was elected as mayor of Santiago, Cuba's second city, during the 1940's. Blacks also achieved leadership in the labor union movement. As in the United States, blacks and mulattoes excelled in sports, entertainment and the arts. Blacks were also well represented in Batista's army and police force.[45]

Batista himself provides an interesting view into race relations in pre-1959 Cuba. Although the official records of his birth and ancestry are conveniently shroudded in mystery, he was generally believed to have been a mulatto with perhaps, some Chinese ancestry.[46] He rose from very humble beginnings to become the strongman of Cuba roughly from 1933 to 1958. According to Montaner, one of Batista's greatest ambitions was to be accepted socially by the Island's upper-classes. This ambition, notwithstanding the adage that money whitens, was never realized. Racial prejudices run deep in Cuba, although carefully camouflaged on the surface. In the upper circles, it was better to be a thief than black. In his

youth, Batista, was known as "mulatto lindo" (pretty-boy mulatto). When he assumed power, he was known as "el indio" (the Indian) as a euphemism alluding to his mixed racial ancestry. However, his detractors simply referred to him, in private, as "ese negro" (that Negro). It should be recognized that no small part of the opposition to Batista in Cuba had racial overtones. A common expression of the time referred to the need to get rid of "ese negro" at all costs, come what may. But Batista was no champion for blacks and mulattos in Cuba, he dreamed, in vain, of being admitted to the inner sanctum of the Cuban high classes.[47]

Aquirre notes that blacks (i.e., blacks and mulattos) constituted 25.9%[48] in 1943, and accounted for more than 30% of the musicians, artists, bricklayers, dressmakers, carpenters, decorators, tinsmiths, cigarmakers, shoemakers, stevedores, painters, bakers, and cooks. Eighteen percent of all primary school teachers in Cuba in 1943 were Afro-Cubans. Blacks had also achieved parity in such skilled occupations such as boilermakers, jewelers, bookkeepers, typists, stenographers, radio mechanics, watch repairmen and auto mechanics.[49] Nelson observed that in none of the broad occupational groups do blacks fall markedly low which he accepts as evidence that there was no rigid color line in Cuba as far as the major occupations were concerned.[50] Entralgo perceptively noted, however, that blacks tended to be concentrated on the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder.[51] For example, in the cigar industry blacks rolled cigars and removed the tobacco stems, but whites classified the tobacco and finished the cigars.[52]

There is ample evidence to support the existence of certain patterns of institutionalized racial discrimination in Cuba. In general, blacks and mulattoes were under-represented in the political system, civil service, the professions, banking and finance. Also blacks and mulattoes suffered chronic unemployment and underemployment to a greater extent than whites in the post-World War II

period in Cuba. Blacks and mulattoes tended to earn less than whites, even in the same occupations. The exception was, of course, in agriculture where the influence of color on earnings appeared to have been negligible.[53] The incidence of racial discrimination also tended to vary by provinces, e.g., strongest in Camaguey and Las Villas and weakest in Oriente.[54] It is also interesting to note that with the exceptions of the Race War of 1912 and the racial outbreak in Trindad (Cuba) in 1934, there were few recorded instances of violent racial confrontations in Cuba.[55] Although Aguirre recognizes the existence of racial discrimination in Cuba, he denies that is was a racially divided camp wherein blacks were mercilessly exploited.[56] Cubans, by temperament, are less rigid and formal in their institutional arrangements than, say, Americans.[57] Therefore, the color line was not always observed. In addition to the areas of sports, entertainment and the arts, blacks and whites also mingled rather freely in the worlds of prostitution, crime, drugs, gambling and superstitution. The more formal social activities tended to be rather strictly segregated. Throughout the Island, there were social and religious clubs organized along strict racial lines, e.g., for white only, for mulatto only and for black only. The relationships, as recorded by many popular sayings, between blacks and mulattoes were ambivalent, often within the same families. Interracial marriages, where they occurred, tended to be white men with non-white women more often than vice versa.[58] Masferrer and Mesa-Lago found evidence to suggest that blacks and mulattoes were gradually being integrated in the mainstream of Cuban society.[59]

The fact that the overwhelming majority (over 90%) of Cubans in the United States classify themselves as white suggests that the Cuban immigration to the United States has been racially selective given the approximately 30% of blacks and mulattoes living in Cuba.[60] Aguirre found it paradoxical that as immigration

increased in Cuba, black Cubans participated far less than the relative share of the general Cuban population.[61] Furthermore, Aguirre does not believe that the tendency of black Cubans to remain in Cuba to be a function of the pre-1959 "caste-like system" of occupational discrimination and segregation that had isolated them from full participation in Cuba society. Aguirre identifies three major factors which taken collectively discriminated against black Cuban immigration to the United States.[62]

First, Aguirre calls attention to the importance of the extended family networks, capital assets, personal and business of the upper class Cuban, which by definition excluded blacks, were among the first to feel threatened by the Revolution and had the means to immigrate in the First Wave. Secondly, the immigration policy of the United States gave priority to the relatives of the Cubans already living in the United States which further discriminated against blacks.[63] Llanes also reports that visa waivers were being issued by the United States Embassy to all Cubans who had relatives in the United States.[64] Thirdly, the ideological climate created by the Revolution[65] relative to the removal of the last vestiges of racial discrimination.[66] There are good indications that, at least, during the early years of the Revolution, there were a number of programs which benefited the lower socio-economic groups where most blacks were clustered this generating their support.[67] Kahl held that blacks for the first time in Cuba, about one-third of the population, shared equally in the goods and services, and the civic respect of their society. Furthermore, blacks were fully integrated in the schools and on the job.[68] Over time, however, it would appear that the support of these groups has become tenuous. In exchange for the benefits of fuller participation in Cuba, the Revolution has exacted a high price of double loyalty from blacks.[69] A double standard was imposed by the Revolution whereas white Cubans need not be necessarily revolutionaries, if they are prudent, silent and obedient, they can

literally hide under a rock and watch the Revolution go by. But, blacks, on the other hand, must pay the Revolution back in the most visible and strident manner possible for all the benefits that the Revolution has allegedly bestowed upon them. In Montaner's view this is a form of official racist policy. Blacks who dare attempt to emigrate suffer all manner of humiliations and racial slurs, as traitors to the Revolution and as traitors to their race.[70] A black Cuban once observed in the mid 1960's that before the Revolution he only remembered that he was black when he shaved, now during the Revolution they remind him of his race every day.[71] Another black expressed that they (the Revolution) needed him in Angola because of his race.[72] Although, blacks made up a third of the Cuban population they substantially under-represented (only 7%) in the ranks of ruling elite.[73] Juan Almeida Bosque is the only black Army officer of any real importance in Cuba[74] and spends some of his time composing popular music.[75] Based on the above discussion it appears that the combination of social class, United States immigration policy and revolutionary ideological collectively discriminated against black Cuban immigration.

IV. White and Black Cubans in the United States

Generally, there is agreement among cubanologists that the recent influx of the Cubans via the Port of Mariel will alter the racial composition of Cuban-Americans given the higher proportion of blacks, i.e., 20-40%, among them.[76] Further research will be needed to trace the socio-economic adaptation of these newly arrived black Cubans to life in the United States.

Geographically, in 1970, white Cubans prefer (52.3%) to live in the South primarily in Dade County, Florida. Whereas, black Cubans (58.5%) prefer to live in the Northeast, primarily in the New York, New Jersey bistate area. Over time,

there appears to be a secondary migration of white Cubans south, black Cubans north further segregating black and white Cubans.[77] As late of 1970, discrimination against black Cubans in Miami was surprisingly strongest in the predominately Cuban areas as compared to the white, black and/or racially mixed areas. At that time, Miami's Little Havana area was almost lily-white with only a negligible 0.8% black population.[78] Whereas about the same time, black Cubans felt more accepted in the large Cuban-American community in New Jersey. It was also observed that the New Jersey black Cubans tended to americanize more slowly than similarly situated white Cubans.[79]

Using 1980 United States Census data, Pérez confirms that Cuban-American exhibit a high degree of concentration in a few communities. For example, the Miami-Fort Lauderdale area, i.e., Dade and Broward countries of the State of Florida account for slightly more than 52 percent of the entire Cuban-American population in the United States. This Florida community when added to the Greater New York (which includes Northern New Jersey) and Los Angeles, constitute more than three-fourths of the Cuban American population. Compared the 1970 Census, Cuban-Americans exhibit a strong tendency towards greater concentration in Florida. During the same 1970-1980 period, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans tended to disperse from their traditional areas of concentration. A state-by-state comparison shows that the proportion of all Cuban-Americans declined everywhere except in Florida where it increased greatly.[80]

Prohías and Casal had noted this tendency of Cuban-Americans towards greater concentration especially in Florida in spite of the intial dispersion efforts of the Cuban Refugee Resettlement Program.[81] This is the "trickle-back" or secondary migration phenomenon which the 1980 data show that precisely many of the communities that received large numbers of resettled Cubans during the 1960's

are the very same communities that report the loss of substantial numbers of Cuban-Americans to Florida during the 1970-1980 decade.[82]

Of the estimated 125,000 Cubans who arrived in the United States via the Mariel boat-lift, about 100,000 or 80% have settled in South Florida despite earlier efforts to disperse them around the country.[83]

Pérez, unfortunately, is silent on the geographic distribution and migration patterns of black Cubans. The Census data on racial classification must be approached with the utmost caution. There was substantial confusion concerning the self-identification on both racial and ethnic terms. More research will need to be done in order to be order to assign appropriate confidence intervals around the data that were reported. It is conceivable that unknown numbers of Cubans did not even answer the racial identification item and were classified as "other" racially. Also, it is possible, that certain Cubans understood "black" to refer to black-Americans exclusively. Owing to different racial classification schemes in the United States, i.e., dichotomous (black or white) and, on, at least, trichotomous (black, white or mixed), some individual may be experienced difficulty in reconciling the two schemes for the middle elements. At minimum, those individuals who did identify themselves unequivocally as black or white, suggest a North American racial consciousness over that of those Cuban-Americans who remain somewhat racially ambigious. Taken with the above and other reservations, the following primarily and thus tentative racial identification data on Cuban-Americans should be viewed as suggestive, i.e., a first cut, rather than definitive in nature:

Table 1[84]

	All Cubans	White	Black	Other
U.S.	806,223 (100%)	676,586 (84%)	24,253 (3%)	105,384 (13%)
Fla.	469,312 (100%)	415,912 (89%)	5,180 (1%)	48,220 (10%)
NJ	84,325 (100%)	73,055 (87%)	1,836 (2%)	9,379 (11%)
NY	79,378 (100%)	54,608 (69%)	8,446 (11%)	16,324 (20%)
Cal.	63,797 (100%)	47,947 (75%)	2,109 (3%)	13,741 (22%)
Ill.	19,746 (100%)	14,612 (74%)	807 (4%)	4,327 (22%)
Bal. U.S.	89,665 (100%)	70,452 (79%)	5,875 (6%)	13,338 (15%)

Source: Summary Provided by Norma Marti
Chicago Office of the United States
Census Bureau - February 26, 1985

In the states of Florida and New Jersey white Cuban-Americans constitute 89% and 87% of the Cuban-American populations which higher than the 84% of white Cuban-Americans nationally. The percentage of white Cuban-Americans is below their national percentage share in the states of California, Illinois, and New York by 75%, 74%, and 69% respectively. At the extremes, 89% of Cuban-Americans in Florida are white versus 69% in New York State. On the other hand, black Cuban-Americans have their highest percentage share (11%) in New York State and their lowest (1%) in Florida. These data seem to suggest that the white Cuban-Americans tend to concentrate in the states of Florida and New Jersey, as the Pérez study noted.[85] Black Cuban-Americans seem to be moving in a different direction. By far, New York State is home to approximately 35% of the all black Cuban-Americans which is the largest single concentration of black Cuban-Americans in the United States. This apparent differences in geographical distribution raises a number of perplexing questions concerning race relations among Cuban-Americans themselves. How much of the observed racial differences are attributed to pre-revolutionary values and practices? Also, to what extent have differential racial attitudes, values and practices been acquired since

immigration to the United States, especially to the then highly segregated Greater Miami area? This is a full agenda for further research.

As has been noted, ethnicity in the American context is a new and difficult concept for Cuban-Americans.[86] "Etnia" in Cuba is a euphemism for "social race." Social race refers to categories that are socially defined, although the terms by which they are labeled may have originally referred to the phenotypical characteristics, e.g., black, white, Indian or mulatto, do not have genetic meaning in most Latin American societies, more over the criteria for defining social races differ from region to region in Latin America. For example, in one region, social ancestry may be stressed; in another region, socio-economic criteria are emphasized; and still other regions, physical appearance becomes the primary basis for classifying people according to social race.[87] Apparently, the social race in Cuba was determined more on ancestry than on socio-economic status and physical appearance. Using Batista as an example, being a light-skinned mulatto he may very well have been classified as white. It is believed that at that time, he was one of the richest man in the world.[88] The rejection of Batista, therefore, seemed due to his supposed racial ancestry.

In Dade County, Florida, for example, where 80% of the Hispanics are Cuban Americans, 15% of all marriages were between Spanish-surnamed whites and non-Spanish surnamed white, 8% between Spanish-surnamed blacks and non-Spanish surnamed blacks, and only 4% between Spanish-surnamed whites and Spanish surnamed blacks.[89] These data indicate that Cuban-Americans are nearly four times more likely to marry non-Spanish-surnamed whites than Spanish-surnamed blacks.

Much has been written and said about the success of Cuban-Americans in the arena of free enterprise. During the early days of the First Wave, national

magazines, The New York Times,[90] and the broadcast media featured the "rags-to-riches" stories of Cubans who had arrived on the shores of the United States penniless and, in a few years later, had risen to positions of power in American society. This type of story quickly circulated among Cubans themselves and variously labeled as "the Cuban success story," or "the Cuban miracle" until it became a widely accepted myth. Proponents of this myth, are quick to point to the twenty bank presidents, 220 bank vice presidents and some 19,000 businesses run by Cuban-Americans as living proof.[91] Llanes, notes that although it is a myth, there is one good thing about it in that it motivates a substantial number of Cuban-Americans to try to emulate it and thus move up the socio-economic status ladder to success.[92] However, Díaz reports that Cubans no longer respond to this to the myth of a "golden exile." As a group, they have made a fast adjustment to American society. Yet even as many Cubans achieved success in their new life in this country, other experienced social and economic difficulties and problems characteristic of other immigrants.[93]

In Miami, Cuban-Americans live or attempt to relive in "La Cuba de Ayer" (the pre-1959 Cuba). "La Cuba de Ayer" is a mythical country that they have fabricated, where nostalgia and myths abound. Llanes carefully notes that in "Little Havana nostalgia turns to nightmare as it mixes with American Kitsch."[94]

Aguirre observes that white Cubans in the United States created the myth that all black Cubans were solidly with the Revolution because, in their view, the Revolution had catered to them. They accuse Castro of "creating" the race problem in Cuba.[95] To the extent that this myth is held by white Cubans will reflect on their acceptance of the newly arrived black Cubans in their midst.

V. A Cuban-American Counterpoint?

It is an open question of whether the Cuban counterpoint of which Ortiz observed above will reappear in the Cuban-American community.

The expectations are the Cuban-American middle-class will continue to assimilate until their hair is blonde, their eyes blue or green, and their names, Jones, Smith, Rivers, Rodgers. They will lose more of their culture than other groups; and the Spanish language will be retained only by those who see it as a business or political necessity. Cuban traditions and customs will be only objects of passing curiosity and occasional cocktail party small talk. These people will be total radicals to the right of William Buckley, not as bright and cheery. Or they may even be apolitical, having discovered that politics is bad for business. Relations with Cuba will affect them only to the extent that a change in policy towards Cuba might do harm to their business interests in Miami and elsewhere.[96]

On the other side of the counterpoint, Llanes notes that there will be the poor, the dark-skinned, the high school dropouts. Theirs is not going to be an easy lot. They will continue to be marginal and consequently will continue to polarize.[97] In a very real sense, according to Aguirre, the immigration of black Cubans means a loss of national identity. Black Cubans can harbor few, if any, illusions of belonging to a nation in exile, patiently marking time until a triumphal return to Cuba. Therefore, it was not surprising that in 1970, 40.1% black Cubans had become United States citizens as compared to 23.8% for white Cubans.[98] Llanes believes that black Cubans will find a "degree of resonance" with the North American black cultural group.[99] There appears to exist some ambivalence in the relationships between black Americans and black Cubans in particular (and black Hispanics in general).[100] Wilson shares some very personal experiences with black Americans in this context.[101] Bryce-Laporte correctly states the double invisibility or double minority status of foreign born blacks in the United States and the ambivalence which follows.[102] Because people that are black is no more a call to unity per se, than that found among white people. A recent study reports that

immigrants who stay in clusters with well developed basic support systems tend to adjust better to life in a new environment than those who are dispersed into the general population.[103] An immediate problem for the newly arrived (1980) black Cubans is in which community, i.e., black-American or Cuban-American, do they belong? Having the credentials for membership in both, will they be accepted in either, both or none? If they are rejected by both the black-American and the Cuban-American communities will they develop their own marginal and polarized sub-community?[104]

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